Unfortunately Stupidity Doesnt Break Terms Of Service

People should learn not to be increadibly stupid before they start criticizing beloved actors and public figures.

This guy dale k myers might as well hang it up.
http://jfkfiles.blogspot.com/2007_08_01_archive.html

He criticizes Richard Beltzers commedy;
"...After President Kennedy's head was exploded, Lee Harvey Oswald was discovered on the second floor of the Book Depository building drinking a Coke. His presence was verified by his boss, Roy Truly, and motorcycle patrolman Marion Baker..."

Wait a second, weren't Truly and Baker the ones who "discovered" Oswald? They couldn't verify their own discovery, could they? Sorry, I notice nuances like that. The important point here is that neither man saw Oswald "drinking a Coke" as Belzer says. Here's the testimony of both men on the subject:

He then proceeds to insert the testamony. Well earlier in the article this innane moron rampages about splitting hairs and splitting the split hairs when it comes to the warren commission... then of course his whole article is about splitting the split hairs that others have split...

The increadibly stupid thing about his comment is that Lee Oswald was discovered on the second floor by Truely and Baker just as he says. And he was discovered just before that with a coke in his hand by his boss.

Mrs. Reid.
Well, I kept walking and I looked up and Oswald was coming in the back door of the office. I met him by the time I passed my desk several feet and I told him, I said, "Oh, the President has been shot, but maybe they didn't hit him."He mumbled something to me, I kept walking, he did, too. I didn't pay any attention to what he said because I had no thoughts of anything of him having any connection with it at all because he was very calm. He had gotten a coke and was holding it in his hands and I guess the reason it impressed me seeing him in there I thought it was a little strange that one of -the warehouse boys would be up in the office at the time, not that he had done anything wrong. The only time I had seen him in the office was to come and get change and he already had his coke in his hand so he didn't come for change and I dismissed him. I didn't think anything else.

Well isnt it sick that the warren commission went out of its way to not say anything about how Lee was a father that day and he was wandering around mumbling about that? What really gets me about this whole time period of the testimony is Dullard (allen dulles evil incarnate rt wing christian) allways takes over the testimony and sooo obviously makes sure it syncs to where it will show that Lee had plenty of time to stash the rifle and get down to the second floor where he is wittnessed. The fact is working with agents he hoodwinked the wittnesses... The patrolman was pretty close except when others did the same thing he described they were on the second floor where he saw Lee in under a minute and in other interviews he admits it took him no less than 45 seconds but problably under a minute. Now with all the examples and complaints we have from warren commission wittnesses of falsified testimony and coerced testimony allways tilting tward Lee as the killer who are you going to believe.

The have Lees boss at the door turning and running up to the second floor before the cop every gets to the building. She never sees anyone in the hallway and neither does the cop and Truely who knows reid and would certainly have noticed her. They purposely skirt the time shes in her office before Lee walks through but she does say she was pacing back and forth the indication is twice which would maybe on the outside take a few seconds. So she had to have been there only a minute before she saw Lee and the patrol man and Truely must have caught him going from there out of the building after he had left through her office.

Now im not saying like Beltzer that Lee couldnt have fired shots. But him being spotted on the 2nd floor by people running almost immediately after the shots sure is a strong indication.

The real damning information has allways been the cover up. We all know that Dullard, ford and arlan spector etc covered up at every step. There is absolute proof that there was a second shooter and that means there were at least 2 people firing that day. arlan spector went out of his way to work with the fbi to make sure that the Spectrographic Analysis of the bullit fragments found were not entered as evidence in the warran commission hearings. These point out clearly that there were 2 different types of lead found as bullet fragments. Not only that but this account of the endgame of all this playing around by je hoover head of the fbi shows that he and ford and spector under the cold glare of alan dullard were clearly colluding to hide the truth on this and all other aspects of the investigation.

Guinn later reinforced this impression when he described the systematic error that spread the data for each fragments over a wide range and blurred the fragments into one another. But a careful reading of the full passage from which the above segment was drawn shows, however, that the letter is more specific than that—it states only that the [two] larger fragments could not be differentiated (stretcher and front seat—Q1 and Q2). It does not say whether the smaller fragments could be differentiated. Figure 4 below reveals, though, that the smaller fragments, with the possible exception of Q9, are just as differentiable as the larger fragments are. Hoover’s remark thus appears odd. But no matter how these paragraphs are read, their clear message is that the FBI was unwilling to identify groups of fragments or origins of individual fragments. The plot thickens when we realize that the FBI did indeed take its interpretation well beyond Hoover’s letter. Hoover drew his letter from text recommended by R. H. Jevons of the FBI, included as an attachment to the abovementioned memo of 6 July 1964 to Mr. Conrad of the FBI. The purpose of the memo was to report the FBI’s NAA results and their interpretation of them. The text of the memo contains only two paragraphs, the first of which became Hoover’s letter. The second paragraph is key here. It amplifies the first paragraph by noting that the FBI had indeed found two groups of fragments—the very groups that are obvious from the plot—but that they considered them probabilistic rather than “positive.” Because of the extreme importance of this memo, we reproduce it in its entirety:
As previously reported to the Commission, certain small lead fragments uncovered in connection with this matter were analyzed spectrographically to determine whether they could be associated with one or more of the larger bullet fragments and no significant differences were found within the sensitivity of the spectrographic method. Because of the higher sensitivity of neutron activation analysis certain of the small lead fragments were subjected to neutron activation analyses and comparisons with the larger bullet fragments. While minor variations in composition were found by this method, these were not considered sufficient to permit positively differentiating among the larger bullet fragments and thus positively identifying from which of the larger bullet fragments any given small lead fragment may have come. Generally speaking, the small lead metal particles fell into two categories. In one category fell the small lead fragment from the arm of Governor Connally and the lead from the almost intact bullet recovered from the stretcher. In the other category fell the lead particles from the head of President Kennedy, the lead fragments from the rear floor of the car and the lead from the mutilated bullet fragment from the front seat cushion. While there is a probability that the fragment from [next words apparently blacked out; probably “the Governor’s arm”] came from the whole bullet rather then [sic] from the mutilated bullet and that the fragments from the President’s head and from the floor of the car could have come from the mutilated bullet fragment from the front seat cushion, it remains a probability and does not permit a positive finding or statement that any given small lead fragment did in fact come from one of the bullets to the exclusion of the others. Accordingly, the proposed letter to the Commission reports that the findings do not permit a positive determination as to the particular origin of any of the small lead metal fragments. A tabulation of the results of the analyses is attached hereto. A letter is attached for forwarding to the President’s Commission.
The FBI had even graphed the concentrations of antimony in the five fragments and shown them with confidence limits of 95% and 99%. The graph (courtesy of NARA and Mr. W. A. Marsh), shown as Figure 3, removes any doubt that the FBI's NAA results group the particles into two groups or that the FBI knew this. Q1 and Q9 group clearly, as do the remaining Q2, Q4,5, and Q14.
Figure 3. The FBI's graph of the concentration of antimony in the five basic fragments.
In other words, the FBI had categorized the fragments into two groups: the Governor’s arm and the stretcher versus the President’s head, the rear floor, and the front seat. These are just the groups seen in Figure 4 below. Of course it could not be stated with certainty that a small fragment from one group originated from the bullet in that group—the very nature of the analytical and matching procedure precluded that. (Recall from above that equality of composition does not equal identity of origin.) Jevons’s memo and Hoover’s letter were thus correct on a technicality—the NAA results did not “positively determine” origins because they could not. In other words, their strong-looking statement says exactly nothing. The FBI should have realized this limitation of similarity measurements before they began the neutron activation, because it is a fundamental principle of any chemical matching technique. If they realized it only later, they are less competent than generally supposed. If they realized it from the beginning, they appear to have used it as an excuse to avoid commenting on the fragments. Either explanation raises uncomfortable questions about the FBI. Maybe they really didn’t want to say anything unless they could be certain of it. But if so, why did they start down a road that led only to uncertain results? Because the AEC pushed them too much to resist? No matter how the FBI’s silence is viewed, they highly misled the Commission by failing to report their preliminary groupings. They also gave themselves an undeserved black eye by leaving the impression that they couldn’t handle the neutron activation. The FBI clearly knew a lot more about those fragments than they let on. Why did they hide it?
The FBI’s NAA was far better than portrayed Over the years, the distinct impression has been created that the FBI’s 1964 neutron-activation analysis was preliminary and indeterminate, and that Guinn’s 1977 analysis was thorough and decisive. From my initial readings on the subject, I certainly came to believe this. But I eventually came to realize that the FBI’s analysis was much better than generally appreciated, and that Guinn’s analysis was less thorough than portrayed. In many ways that mattered most, the FBI did it better than Guinn. To be sure, the FBI was forced to use the lower-resolution NaI(Tl) gamma-ray detectors for their 1964 analysis because the superior Ge(Li) detectors were not yet available in quantity. But that didn’t significantly degrade their results. To be sure, the FBI couldn’t or wouldn’t take the time for proper background studies on WCC/MC bullets. For whatever reason, Gallagher analyzed only two other WCC/MC bullets, one from each of two production lots. He analyzed no bullets of any other types. But that was no hindrance, because the two bullets he chose were just as different as Guinn later found. To be sure, the FBI limited themselves to measuring silver and antimony in the fragments. They detected copper but did not quantify it, and they failed to explore the potential of other elements available from neutron activation. But silver and antimony are the two most useful elements that can be determined in bullets by NAA, so that was no hindrance. The FBI did the important stuff right—all fragments analyzed in replicate, results graphed, confidence limits calculated, fragments tentatively classified into two groups—but then they incomprehensibly refused to make any of this public. They had the right answer in their grasp, but stopped just short of clinching it. Then they sealed away their work so securely that only now, thirty years later, do we realize that it holds the key to much of the assassination. For thirty long years, dedicated assassination researchers have suffered needlessly because the FBI refused to tell what they found in 1964. Why did they turn suddenly silent? Why did they make it almost impossible for future students of the case to piece together their pioneering NAA work and its great significance? What was so important as to cause someone in authority to hide all their findings? To me, this is one of the biggest mysteries of the assassination.
Guinn finds a systematic error Now back to the results in Table 12. In Analytical Chemistry, Guinn described how he obtained the FBI’s results, how he recalculated them, and how he interpreted them in the light of his results. He correctly noted that (1) the data for silver are not sufficient to distinguish groups of fragments; (2) if the four sets of data on antimony are lumped together, groups of fragments cannot be distinguished; but (3) if the antimony results from each run are plotted separately, two groups of fragments are seen consistently: Q1/Q9 versus Q2/Q4,5/Q14. Those groups agree with Guinn’s results, with the single-bullet theory, and with several other aspects of the validated physical evidence on the assassination. Figure 4 shows the FBI’s four sets of results for antimony in the fragments. Note how nearly parallel the results from the four runs are. Guinn was almost certainly correct in ascribing these differences to some systematic error of preparing the standards, irradiating, positioning the samples during counting, or calculating the results. Thirty years after the fact, though, there is no way to know exactly where the errors crept in.
Figure 4. The FBI’s four sets of results for antimony in the JFK fragments.
Guinn also correctly stressed that these systematic errors don’t matter terribly, for once identified, they can be compensated for. From Figure 4 it is obvious that in each run, fragments Q1 and Q9 (stretcher bullet and Connally’s wrist) grouped together at high concentrations, and fragments Q2, Q4,5, and Q14 (front seat, JFK brain, rear carpet) grouped together at lower concentrations. We consider the statistics of these groups later—for now it is enough to note their existence.
A second systematic error While examining the FBI’s NAA data in Table 13, I thought I noticed an inverse relation between concentrations of antimony and weights of fragments: heavy fragments had systematically lower antimony than light fragments did. To check this out, I made several plots of concentration versus weight, and confirmed this effect. The simplest of the plots is Figure 5. Here the average concentration of antimony in each of the five basic fragments (as reported by Guinn in Analytical Chemistry) is plotted against the total mass of the fragment, for each of the FBI’s four runs. This is the way that a mass effect would be sought most directly from Table 12. (Individual runs had to be plotted separately so that systematic differences between the runs would not interfere with detecting a mass effect.) An inverse mass effect is clearly seen, most regularly for Runs 1 and 2, but for the others as well. This figure shows that the two fragments in the high-antimony group (Q1 and Q9) are just the ones with the smallest mass. If this figure were all we knew about the system, we might conclude that the two groups of fragments were just an artifact of the weights of fragments comprising them. If the concentration of antimony is plotted against the average mass of subfragments in a fragment (the total mass of the fragment divided by the number of subfragments comprising it), a similar pattern is seen (Figure 6), but with the positions of Q4,5 and Q14 reversed. Again, the groupings would appear to be artifactual.

Figure 5. Average antimony in the five basic fragments vs. the total mass of the fragments.

Figure 6. Average antimony in the basic fragments vs. the average mass per fragment analyzed.
The groups are not an artifact. This can be seen from Figure 7, which shows the concentrations of antimony in the 21 individual subfragments versus the mass of the subfragments. The FBI’s two groups of fragments are plotted separately here, because they had different mean concentrations of antimony.

Figure 7. Antimony in subfragments vs. mass of subfragments, all data.
Figure 5 reveals that both groups of fragments show a regular inverse trend of concentration with mass, with the high-antimony group (Q1, Q9) falling systematically above the low-antimony group. For both groups, the highest concentrations are associated with fragments whose mass is less than about three milligrams. For masses of fragments greater than about five milligrams, the effect of mass is very small. The largest effect is seen for the Q1/Q9 group, because it has more fragments of smaller mass than the low-antimony group does. Could the difference in average antimony between groups be explained simply by one having more light fragments that the other, and therefore a higher average antimony? If so, the two groups would be apparent rather than real—an artifact of mass of fragments rather than any inherent characteristic of the lead in the bullets. Under this scenario, no fragments could be differentiated by mass, and all hope of supporting the single-bullet theory chemically would collapse. The answer is a clear “no,” because the two groups of fragments fall on two parallel lines, not one line. Note that with increasing mass of fragments, the line for the Q1/Q9 group remains clearly above the line for the other group. The groups maintain a separation of 100–150 ppm of antimony wherever they can be compared, which is from about 1–7 milligrams of mass. Thus the groups are clearly different, even though they both show the mass effect. Lastly, Figure 8 examines whether a mass effect is displayed by the subfragments within each fragment. Like Figure 7, it plots the antimony in each subfragment, but separately for each of the five large fragments. Although the plot is a bit messy, an inverse effect of mass can be seen for Q1, Q4,5, and Q2. Q9 shows no effect because the masses of its three particles are all about the same; Q 14 simply shows no effect. Thus the inverse mass effect is seen in three of the four particles whose masses vary enough to make an effect detectable.
Figure 8. Antimony in subfragments vs. mass of subfragments, each fragment plotted separately.
What caused the mass effect? I don’t believe it represents a fundamental property of the fragments because I can’t think of anything that would cause it. The most likely explanation would be some artifact of the FBI’s analysis, some problem that made small amounts of antimony seem disproportionately large. An obvious candidate would be an improper background subtraction in calculating the area of the photopeaks. If insufficient background counts on either side of the peak were subtracted from the gross area of the peak, large peaks would remain largely unaffected but small peaks would appear too large, just the effect observed here. Of course, it is nearly impossible to determine whether this explanation is correct, now that so many years have elapsed since the original analysis. Does this inverse mass effect matter? Not really. Figures 7 and 8 show that both basic groups of fragments show the effect, and that they clearly differ by 100–150 ppm of antimony. Thus with or without the mass effect, the same groupings of fragments are found. The inverse mass effect does not prohibit us from differentiating samples Q1 and Q9 from samples Q2, Q4,5, and Q14.

http://karws.gso.uri.edu/JFK/Scientific_topics/NAA/NAA_and_assassination_II/FBI_tries_NAA.html

And this is just the beginning. There are tons of places where dullard and friends are caught with their hands in the cookie jar. Which means one thing; that they had promised the killers that they would make sure they never paid for their perverted acts of treasonous murder.